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Autocrats in many developing countries have extracted enormous personal rents from power. In addition,
they have imposed inefficient policies including pervasive patronage spending. I present a model in
which the presence of ethnic identities and the absence of institutionalized succession processes allow
the ruler to elicit support from a sizeable share of the population despite large reductions in welfare.
The fear of falling under an equally inefficient and venal ruler that favors another group is enough
to discipline supporters. The model predicts extensive use of patronage, ethnic bias in taxation and
spending patterns and unveils a new mechanism through which economic frictions translate into increased
rent extraction by the leader. These predictions are consistent with the experiences of bad governance,
ethnic bias, wasteful policies and kleptocracy in post-colonial Africa.
Gerard Padro i Miquel






Di⁄erent strands of research have pointed to the importance of institutions as determi-
nants of economic development. Political institutions in￿ uence policy determination by
placing constraints on the behavior of leaders and inducing them to take into account the
well-being of their citizens1. When institutions are weak, such as in most sub-Saharan
post-colonial Africa, examples abound of rulers able to extract enormous rents from power
in a seemingly unconstrained manner2. However, these rulers also engaged in extensive
redistribution of resources in surprisingly ine¢ cient ways, which suggests the existence of
constraints on the exercise of power. Speci￿cally, they often raised revenue through costly
market manipulations and then spent on inoperant bureaucracies that served as distrib-
ution channels for patronage3. Such policies have taken a heavy toll on the performance
of developing economies4. Surprisingly, in spite of their conspicuous wealth accumulation
and their mismanagement of the economoy some of these leaders have received active
support from sizeable shares of their impoverished populations.5 This raises the following
questions: why do parts of the population support these leaders? Why do these leaders
choose to engage in wasteful patronage transfers? Why are these leaders not accountable
to their supporters?
To answer these questions, this paper develops a simple framework to analyze the
1The seminal theoretical work on these lines is Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). In these models the
politician is portrayed as an agent of a representative citizen. The leader can shirk to the extent that she
enjoys some informational advantage, but the citizen places limits on this potential shirking by replacing
the ruler when the outcomes are bad.
2See Ayittey (1992) or Mbaku (2000) for an account of the extent of rent extraction. For instance,
several rulers such as Mobutu, Moi or Houphouet-Boigny have been estimated to posess personal fortunes
equivalent to the total foreign debt accumulated by their countries.
3The use of monopsonistic Marketing Boards to extract resources from the agricultural sector (see
Bates 1981), ￿nancial repression and foreign exchange rate manipulations have been some of the highly
ine¢ cient ways revenues have been raised.
4For the e⁄ect of bad policies in Africa, see Collier and Gunning (1999), Easterly and Levine (1997)
and Easterly (2002). For the e⁄ect of political and bureaucratic inoperance see, for instance, Mbaku
(2000).
5It is suprising to see many instances where large populations are easily mobilized by the regime: ethnic
voting is such an example and is pervasive in the continent. This support can also include decentralized
violence against the opposition such as in Rwanda in 1994 or in contemporary Zimbabwe. Note also
that some of the presumed authoritarian leaders, such as Benin￿ s KØrØkou, have been reelected when
multiparty elections have been introduced.
2political economy of this type of regimes. The starting point is a political agency model
in which three assumptions are maintained:
1. A Ruler needs the support of his ethnic group in an ethnically divided society
2. Ruler replacement leads to political instability and increases the likelihood of a
switch of power between ethnic groups
3. Taxation can only vary by economic activity while transfers can target groups di-
rectly
Assumption 1 captures the political salience of ethnicity in these societies. The second
assumption formally captures an aspect of succession that is fundamental in understanding
accountability when institutions are weak. These two assumptions imply a seemingly
paradoxical result: the ruler can maintain support from his ethnic followers even though
he is extracting resources from them. The reason is that in equilibrium, a leader steals
resources from his supporter group, but extracts even more from the opposition group.
If the group in power decides to keep their leader, the stability of the regime maintains
the status quo. If they decide to oust him they face a chaotic succession process in which
they cannot guarantee the next leader will belong to their group. Since their predicament
under the leadership of a politician from another group is worse than under their own
ethnic ruler, the latter can capture the support of his ethnic followers while reducing their
utility.6 I call this fundamental mechanism the Politics of Fear: if succession is not fully
controlled by supporters and they would be worse o⁄ under the opposition, leaders are
not accountable to their own supporters.
Assumption 3 ensures that taxation rates across groups move in parallel in equilibrium.
Since taxation can only be targeted to activities, agents can escape discriminatory taxation
by switching activities. Hence, groups can only be discriminated by the taxing system to
6The opposition leader would like to promise to current supporters that he will not expropriate from
them. However, such promises are not credible in this institutional environment.
3the extent that they do not perfectly arbitrage tax di⁄erences.7 Imperfect mobility across
economic activities thus provides an upper bound to the di⁄erence in taxation that the
ruler can levy, and the levels of taxation that groups su⁄er have to co-move in the same
direction. With this assumption, two additional results can be derived.
First, the model shows that these fears of exclusion spread across groups and compound
the ability of leaders to extract resources. Suppose group A has a strong comparative
advantage in a particular activity that leaves it vulnerable to expropriation. A members
thus know that a B leader would expropriate them. Hence group A￿ s leaders will be able
to extract large rents from their A supporters by virtue of the Politics of Fear. As noted
above, when leader A can tax his supporters heavily, he can also increase taxes on B
citizens. This implies that B citizens also fear an A leader that cannot be reigned in by
his A supporters. As a consequence, when a B leader captures power, his group will allow
him to steal; group A￿ s fear of leadership change allows both A and B leaders to escape
accountability.8
I call this mechanism Ampli￿cation of Kleptocracy: the amount any group leader is
able to divert is increasing in the fear of leadership change that any group feels. This
mechanism is the general equilibrium counterpart of the Politics of Fear and is the force
behind the comparative statics in this paper.
Second, the model provides a rationale for the ine¢ cient use of public funds as re-
sources for patronage to the ethnic kin of the leader. As discussed above, when the ruler
wants to increase rent extraction, he needs to increase taxes in parallel for both groups.
This is constrained by the need to provide his group with enough utility to keep its sup-
7Bureaucratic incapacity forces rulers to extract resources by manipulating markets because income
taxes are not feasible. That there is strati￿cation in economic activities across ethnic groups has long
been noticed. In a classic study, Horowitz (1985) writes ￿Cementing the ethnic division of labor is the
preeminent role of ascriptive ties in economic relations in the developing world￿ . A comparative advantage
in a particular activity implies that an increase of taxation is not met by an immediate withdrawal from
that economic niche.
8The mechanism works for any policy dimension that creates a wedge between supporters and oppo-
sition. As section 4 shows, targeted ethnic violence or durable investment can be exploited in the same
way.
4port. This constraint can be satis￿ed by redistributing targeted patronage to his group9.
For every unit of patronage he supplies to his supporters, he can tax both his supporters
(who are left indi⁄erent) and his opponents. Hence only a fraction of the population
(the supporting group) receives costly patronage in equilibrium but both groups su⁄er
heavy taxation. As a consequence, patronage provides returns to the ruler that are higher
than the social returns. This implies that patronage is provided to the point where the
marginal return to the receiver is below the marginal social cost. When the leader has a
small basis of support this distortion is exacerbated.
Therefore, this framework accounts for the existence of regimes in which weak leaders
(in the sense that they need a sizeable share of the population to defend the regime)
are able to extract enormous resources from the economy. This exploitation is achieved
with the explicit support of the exploited which explains the failure of accountability
observed in these countries. In addition, the framework is consistent with excess public
employment, the presence of ethnic bias in the public o¢ ce corps, regional bias in the
targeting of expenditures and the coexistence of heavy rates of taxation and ine¢ cient
subsidization to supporter groups10. Moreover, the model shows how the economic ethnic
segmentation present in Africa is consistent with the venality of its regimes in its post-
colonial history.
Assumption 2 constitutes the main novelty of my approach. It is designed to capture
a speci￿c way in which institutions and politics in Africa and elsewhere have departed
from the textbook representative democracy. When institutions are weak, the process of
replacing a leader is not mediated by an established political institution, and lies beyond
the control of the citizenry. Since rules of succession are not followed, the stability of the
regime is contingent on the survival of the ruler. In their analysis of personal rule regimes,
Jackson and Rosberg (1982) write ￿a succession [...] alters at least some of the important
9The role of ethnicity as an exclusion device is already present in Bates (1983) and Caselli and Coleman
(2003). As opposed to taxation, patronage can easily be ethnically targeted by biasing the allocation of
funds and bureaucratic posts and using ethnic identi￿cation as a discrimination device.
10As detailed in Bates (1981). Gavazza and Lizzeri (2005) address this phenomenon in a model where
transfers are imperfectly observable.
5relationships and standings among leaders and factions￿ for example, the standing of big
men and the clan and ethnic communities they represent￿and ￿[t]he ultimate uncertainty
in a system of personal rule lies in the key point of vulnerability: the ruler. [...] If he
falls, his relatives, friends, lieutenants, clients and followers also may fall, and the ensuing
political disruption may threaten the political peace.￿Hence, ousting a leader initiates an
uncertain process that involves potential change in the relative status of di⁄erent groups.
The cases of Kenya in 1978 or Cameroon in 1982 are good examples of successions leading
to dramatic switches in the standing of di⁄erent ethnic groups.11
Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2004) note that most qualitative analysts of weakly
institutionalized regimes, often referred to as Personal Rule, Neopatrimonialismor Preben-
dalism, agree that in these countries, the arrangements described in the constitution with
respect to due process, succession or legislative review of the executive are systematically
ignored because the locus of power belongs to the person of the ruler and not to his o¢ ce,
and informalism prevails in every political transaction.12 In their formal analysis, Ace-
moglu et al. emphasize that weak institutions allow leaders to exacerbate the collective
action problem of society. My approach abstracts from collective action problems and
concentrates on the instability of succession rules, thereby unveiling a di⁄erent mecha-
nism. In addition to tackling the weakness of political accountability, my model explains
why some exploited groups explicitly support kleptocratic leaders and also accounts for
their ine¢ cient provision of patronage.
This analysis is a contribution to the literature on the political economy of less devel-
oped polities. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), Ellman and Wantchekon (2000), La Ferrara
and Bates (2001), Robinson and Verdier (2005), and Robinson and Torvik (2002) present
models of electoral competition enriched to capture diverse characteristics of the political
11At the death of Kenyatta in 1978, Daniel arap Moi reaches power. Kenyatta belonged to the Kikuyu
ethnic group that dominated politics in Kenya since independence. After the transition, the balance of
power dramatically moves to the Kalenjin group to which Moi belongs. A similar pattern can be found in
the transition from Ahidjo to Biya in Cameroon and elsewhere in Africa. See for instance Mbaku (2000).
12See Bratton and van der Walle (1997), Jackson and Rosberg (1982), Migdal (1988) and Chabal and
Daloz (1999) among many others. See also Herbst (2000) and Cooper (1999) for a discussion on the
historical roots of this weak institutionalization.
6game in weakly institutionalized polities. In this literature, the presence of strong ethnic
groups in society, the absence of institutional commitment technology or the capacity to
resort to violence are introduced to explain ine¢ cient policy choices and the presence of
clientelism. My model shows that the insights of these previous papers keep their validity
in a political accountability framework. Additionally, it explains why internal competition
within the ruling group cannot dissipate kleptocratic rents.
It has already been suggested that distributional concerns among the citizenry could
weaken accountability (see Ferejohn (1986)). In this work, di⁄erent citizens compete to
be included in the winning coalition of the ruler, thus bidding away all the rents. The
nature of my mechanism is di⁄erent: a ruler is tied to his group, but the prospect of
future exclusion forces supporters to defend the regime and to keep the leader in power.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the
model and the equilibrium concept that will be used. Section III analyzes the model,
describes the equilibrium and contains a discussion on the interpretation of the model
and its results, stressing the comparative statics. Section IV uses the logic of the model
to examine the preponderance of wages over investment in Africa and the prevalence of
ethnic violence. Finally, the last section concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The Environment
Consider an in￿nitely repeated economy populated by a continuum of citizens of mass 1.
Citizens belong to one of two ethnic groups, A and B. The size of group A is ￿A. There
are two economic activities, denoted a and b. A group is de￿ned by two distinct sets of
characteristics. First, there are some ascriptive characteristics such as skin color (maybe
geographical distribution or language) that are identi￿able and, for simplicity, impossible
to change.
7Second, each group possesses a comparative advantage in a di⁄erent portfolio of eco-
nomic activities. A group A citizen obtains !a per period in activity a. Should she decide
to take activity b she would earn !a ￿ ￿
A per period. Symmetrically, a B citizen obtains
!b in activity b and !b ￿ ￿
B in activity a, per period. ￿
i captures the extent to which
a group￿ s wealth is speci￿c to a particular activity. For example, if a citizen obtains her
wealth from co⁄ee, she can switch her e⁄orts to growing rice in her ￿elds. Unfortunately,
co⁄ee trees are a long term speci￿c investment, and hence putting those lands to another
use entails a loss of pre-tax income. In general, a group that is specialized in cash-crops,
especially tree crops, has no way to transfer its planted capital to another activity. The
same is true for groups that relie on ethnic networks to perform particular activities.
On the other hand, ￿
i may simply capture the degree to which specialized knowledge is
useless in another sector. Finally, a small value of ￿
i also captures the possibility that
ethnic groups are not di⁄erentiated by economic activities. For simplicity, assume that
switching is allowed each period. Let zi
t = 1 if group i does not take the activity in which
it enjoys comparative advantage in period t. Otherwise zi
t = 0.
There is a state that performs two functions: it taxes economic activities and uses the
proceeds to provide bene￿ts to groups.
These bene￿ts might be public goods that are so dependent on taste that only one
of the groups enjoys them. The favoured interpretation is that they constitute pure
patronage such as the allocation of public resources to the region of a group or the granting
of lucrative bureaucratic posts (or posts in the army, police, etc.) to members of the
favored group. The state is able to discriminate across recipients of public expenditure
thanks to the ascriptive characteristics of groups.
On the other hand, taxes are activity speci￿c because in particularly poor developing
countries as in Africa, the absence of a competent bureaucracy forces the governments to
raise their revenue from indirect taxation. For instance, the use of Marketing Boards for
agricultural products and other manipulations of the pricing system have been pervasive.13
13Bates (1981) provides a detailed account of these practices. In addition, Bates (1989) shows that
8In the context of the model, I allow taxation to di⁄er across group-activities, but the ability
to imperfectly switch activities will put a ceiling on how di⁄erently one can tax di⁄erent
sources of wealth. Thus note that the fundamental di⁄erence between expenditures and
taxation is that patronage can be perfectly targeted to speci￿c groups.
At any point in time, one ethnic group has control of the government. Even though a
group has the state nominally captured, real power is exercised by a narrow elite inside
the group, and I will call it the Leader. Denote by Li the leader if he is from group i.
In the remainder of the paper, I call the group to which the leader belongs ￿supporter￿
group, and the other is denoted ￿excluded￿group for reasons that will become apparent.
Each group has an unlimited supply of identical leaders from which to choose.
Denote ￿ik the tax level that a leader of group i levies on activity k. Similarly, let
￿ij be the amount that a leader of group i spends on patronage for group j. Obviously
i;j 2 fA;Bg and k 2 fa;bg. The amount ￿ij provides utility R(￿ij) to group j with
R0 > 0, R0(0) > 1, R00 < 0 and R(0) = 0. Group ￿j receives no utility from ￿ij.
This economy has two fundamental states, St 2 fA;Bg, denoting whether power is
captured by group A or group B in period t.
The instantaneous utility of a citizen of group A in state S (the expression for B is
symmetric) is thus:
C(S;z









where time subscripts have been omitted for notational simplicity.








consumption of group j at time t, and ￿ is the discount factor.
Even though the leader belongs to group St, he has self-serving interests. In particular,
he wants to maximize the funds that he can divert for his own uses. A leader of group A
obtains instantaneous utility (the expression for B is just symmetric) as long as he is in























and discounts future payo⁄s by ￿. When a leader is not in power, he obtains 0 utility per
period.
The weakness of institutions and the importance of ethnic links is captured in the
model by the following assumptions. First, assume that whenever the incumbent leader
retains the support of his kin group, he maintains his position with probability ￿ ￿A. With
probability 1 ￿ ￿ ￿A group B is able to dislodge the leader from power and install a B
leader even against a united A group. ￿ ￿A might be well above ￿A to capture the notion
that weakness of institutions and the strength of ethnic links allow for a huge degree
of incumbency advantage. This is the sense in which a group might be able to capture
power. The unique credible source of support and thus the unique credible promise of
future patronage is given by the ruler￿ s ethnic linkage with his own group14.
Second, if the supporters of an incumbent leader decide to subvert the authority of
their leader and want to oust him from power, they succeed automatically, as a leader
with no basis of support cannot survive. Hence the relevant constraint on the interests
of the leader is the need to keep the support of his group. This is the sense in which
the position of the leader is weak: he needs the active support of a sizeable share of the
population to maintain power.
Third, when a leader is ousted from power by his own supporters the state does not
perform its functions for that period. Moreover, the group that is not in power will ￿nd
it easier to use this opportunity to grab power and seat a leader from its ranks. This
14The group has to feature two characteristics: ￿rstly, it has to be very costly to change one￿ s identity
ex-post. Secondly, the ruler has to be able to commit to use the same basis of support in the future. The
experience in Africa and elsewhere suggests that ethnic allegiances possess both features. Fearon and
Laitin (1996), Bates (1983, 2000), Miguel and Gugerty (2005) or Fafchamps (2004) provide examples of
social, economic and political arrangements in Africa that are possible because the existence of ethnic
linkages permits commitment to socially established rules.
10captures the reality of Personal Rule regimes in which successions are always uncertain
matters, resolved in non-institutionalized ways. Thus, I assume that the status of the
group in power will change with probability 1 ￿ ￿S. ￿S captures the degree to which the
grip on power of group S is solid independently of the personality of the ruler. In other
words, ￿ ￿S ￿ ￿S > 0 captures the importance of ￿Personal Rule￿since it measures the
increased stability that retaining the incumbent buys to his supporters. In essence this
assumption just means that stability is good to maintain power.
The timing of each stage game, given state St; is the following:





2. The citizens of group St decide to support, st = 1 or not, st = 0
3. All groups decide to switch activities or not, zA
t ;zB
t 2 f0;1g
4. If st = 1, Pt is implemented and payo⁄s are realized. Next period starts with
St+1 = St with probability ￿ ￿S and the state switches with probability 1 ￿ ￿ ￿S.
5. If st = 0, the leader is ousted immediately and the ￿revolt￿vector Pr = f0;0;0;0g
is implemented. With probability 1 ￿ ￿S, group S loses power and the next period
starts with St+1 = ￿St. Otherwise, the next period starts with a new leader from
group S.
There are a number of features of the model that are worth stressing. First, note
that collective action within a group is not an issue in this model. The focus of the
argument is on the forces that allow rents to be appropriated by a weak leader instead
of competed away by di⁄erent elites inside the same group. Adding heterogeneity and a
collective action problem would only help the current leader to steal even more, because
he would ￿nd it easier to disrupt coordination. Second, and in the same spirit, I do not
allow the leader access to any repression instrument: if he loses the support of his group,
he is replaced at no explicit cost. Third, it is important to note that the excluded group
11in this model always tries to unseat the incumbent. This is a simplifying assumption
introduced because the focus of the analysis is in explaining why the supporter group
actually supports a kleptocratic ruler. To the extent that support from one group is
su¢ cient to guarantee incumbency advantage and it is relatively easier to obtain support
from the kin group of the leader, this assumption is without loss of generality. However,
it does not capture cases in which the leader is forced to subsidize the opposition group
because support from his own group is not enough.
Finally, note that no di⁄erence is made between democracy and dictatorship in the
model. The evidence from Africa shows that democracies have not behaved di⁄erently
than dictatorships at the time of supporting kleptocracies and corruption15.
2.2 De￿nition of Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept to be used is (pure strategy) Markov Perfect Equilibrium. In
this type of equilibria, strategies can only be contingent on the payo⁄-relevant state of
the world and the prior actions taken within the same period.
As has been described above, the state space of this economy includes only two ele-
ments, ￿ = fA;Bg, denoting whether power is captured by group A or group B at the
beginning of period t. Denote the state at each period by St, where obviously St 2 ￿;
8t = 0;1;2:::. Assume that each group has a set of potential leaders from which replace-
ments will be drawn randomly. Call these two sets of leaders ￿A and ￿B. At any point in
time, the leader in power is denoted by LA or LB depending on the group he was drawn
from. Denote by ~LA the potential leaders that belong to ￿A but are not currently in
power. ~LB is de￿ned symmetrically. The strategy of the current leader LA is denoted by
P A and it is a four-tuple f￿Aa;￿Ab;￿AA;￿ABg 2 R4
+ when St = A. When either St = B
or St = A but a leader belongs to ~LA, his set of strategies is empty. The symmetric
de￿nition holds for the strategies of leaders LB.
15See Jackson and Rosberg (1982) or Mbaku (2000) among others.
12The strategy of group A is denoted ￿A(S;P S) and depends on both the state of
political capture and the policy vector proposed by the leader. It determines two actions,
fsA;zAg that have been de￿ned above as the decision to support and the decision to
switch economic activities. If St = A, sA 2 f0;1g. Therefore, if the leader is from group
A, his group can decide to give him support or to subvert his authority. On the other
hand, if St = B, sA = ;. zA 2 f0;1g independently of the state. The symmetric de￿nition
holds for the strategy space of citizens of group B.
State transitions work as follows: whenever sS
t = 1, there is support and St+1 = St
with probability ￿ ￿S and the state switches with probability 1 ￿ ￿ ￿S. If sS
t = 0, that is,
if there is no support, St+1 = St with probability ￿S. Denote this transition function
T(￿S;S).
A (pure strategy) Markov Perfect Equilibrium for this game is a combination of strate-
gies denoted by f ~ P A; ~ P B; ~ ￿A; ~ ￿Bg such that all four strategies are best responses to the






























































where Cj denotes the consumption of citizen j as a function of the state S and the
strategies of the leader in power and both sets of citizens. V j(S) denotes the value
function for citizen j in state S. W i
LS(S) denotes the value function for leader from




￿(A) and W B
~LB(B) are completely independent of any decision
13that the particular leader could take. They only depend on the probability that, in
equilibrium, a particular leader will be in power in the future. As a consequence, these
are not interesting strategic objects in this game. A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is thus
a combination of strategies f ~ P A; ~ P B; ~ ￿A; ~ ￿Bg such that ~ ￿A solves (1), ~ ￿B solves (2), ~ P A
solves (3) and ~ P B solves (4).
3 Analysis
Assume without loss of generality that St = A. The equilibrium is characterized by
backwards induction within each stage game. Hence, I examine ￿rst the decision to
switch the sector of production. Take B producers ￿rst. Note that the decision to switch
does not a⁄ect continuation utilities, hence only the static di⁄erence in payo⁄s is relevant.
After observing the policy vector Pt, they will switch sector only if the loss in wealth is
smaller than the di⁄erence in taxation. Formally,
z
B






The ruler wants to avoid this switch because it reduces revenue. Hence, this ability to
switch provides an upper bound on the di⁄erential taxation that the ruler can levy on










Obviously, both restrictions cannot be binding at the same time.
I examine now the decision to support by A members. Note that the leader is the ￿rst
14player to act in the stage game. As a consequence, since strategies can only be conditional
on the state of the economy, a leader LA always proposes the same policy vector P A. Upon
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Hence the support condition reduces to:
￿
Aa ￿ R(￿





Note that the ruler will always satisfy this constraint by subgame perfection. Not satis-
fying it gives him no bene￿t because in the period he is thrown out he already receives
0 utility (and he obtains 0 forever after). Condition (7) embodies the ￿Politics of Fear￿
mechanism. Note that when the left hand side is positive, the ruler is actually reduc-
ing the utility of his supporters. The right hand side of the condition is positive when
V A(A)￿V A(B) > 0, namely when the group fares worse under the leadership of another
group than under a leader from their midst. This gap creates the fear that allows the
ruler to extract resources from his supporters. The bigger is the gap in discounted future
payo⁄s, the more the current ruler can extract before being held accountable. The map-
ping between the di⁄erence in future utilities and today￿ s rent extraction is multiplied by
(￿ ￿A ￿ ￿A), the incumbency advantage that the group as a whole loses when it decides to
replace the leader. The more the group￿ s hold on power is dependent on the current ruler,
the more he can exploit his position16.
16This is a partial equilibrium result. In section 3.3 the full e⁄ect of (￿ ￿A ￿￿A) and (￿ ￿B ￿￿B) is shown
to be even more important as fear ampli￿es across groups.
15For notational simplicity, and because the values will be determined in equilibrium,
denote ￿A = ￿(￿ ￿A ￿ ￿A)(V A(A) ￿ V A(B)). With this simpli￿cation, the problem that a































This program takes as given the equilibrium continuation values of the game and
solves for the best policy vector that the ruler can propose given the two no switching
constraints, (5) and (6), and the need to keep support from his group. Since (5) and (6)
are respected, by subgame perfection there is no switching. Note that zA = zB = 0 is
already taken into account in the objective function of the ruler. Lemma 1 provides the
solution to this program and is proved in the appendix.
















The structure of this solution is intuitive once it is clear that, at the optimum, all the
constraints of the program except from the second one are binding. First, it is obvious
that ￿AB = 0. The reason is that providing patronage good to the excluded group is
16costly and yields no bene￿t, since what is critical is the support from the leader￿ s group.
Moreover, note that the leader is maximizing rent extraction. Hence, the third constraint
is binding because it puts an upper bound to the amount of rent extraction from the
leader￿ s group. Given the amount of taxation to the supporter group, the ￿rst constraint
can be read as an upper bound to the amount of taxation on the excluded group and thus
it is also binding at the optimum. In intuitive terms, the ruler extracts from his group
just to the point of subversion and given that, he overtaxes the excluded group just to
the point in which they would switch activities.
The optimal level of taxation depends on ￿A and hence on future play, but this is
not the case for optimal patronage provision. From (9) it is clear that patronage is
overprovided to the supporter group. Note that, given the technology, a social planner
would provide patronage to the point where R0(￿AA) = 1. This is the point where the
marginal return to patronage equals the marginal cost of public revenue. Why does the
leader overprovide costly patronage to his supporters?
The answer lies in the fact that the switching constraint for group B is binding. As
a consequence, any increase in ￿Aa allows the ruler to increase ￿Ab on a one-to-one basis.
Constraint (7) shows that increasing R(￿AA) and ￿Aa in parallel maintains the support of
the group, leaving supporters indi⁄erent. However, the ruler is not indi⁄erent: every unit
of patronage to his group costs him only ￿A < 1, but it allows him to increase taxation
to all groups, which means that his return is 1. As a consequence of this imbalance, he
overprovides patronage to his followers and overtaxes both his group and his opponents.
Since the disparity between ￿A and 1 is the reason for this ine¢ ciency, this distortion is
worse the narrower the basis of support of the ruler (the smaller ￿A).
From (11), the excluded group is discriminated not only in terms of patronage, but
also in terms of taxation. However, to say something about the level of taxation in
equilibrium I need to fully solve for the dynamic equilibrium. For notational simplicity,
denote ￿i =
￿(￿ ￿i￿￿i)
1+￿(1￿￿ ￿A￿￿ ￿B). Proposition 1 states the ￿nal result:
17Proposition 1 This model presents a unique MPE. In equilibrium, in state S = A (when
S = B the expressions are symmetric):
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2. The citizens of group A support the ruler (sA = 1) if he proposes P MPE and oust
him if he proposes any other policy vector that provides less instantaneous utility..
3. zA = 0 only if ￿Aa ￿ ￿
A + ￿Ab and zB = 0 only if ￿Ab ￿ ￿
B + ￿Aa
The appendix contains the proof to this proposition. Here I concentrate on the sub-
stantive predictions of the model and how to interpret the result and relate it to the facts
obseved in Africa.
3.1 Policy Determination and Ethnic Bias
This unique MPE of the model provides a framework to understand many features of the
post-colonial political economy of Africa.
First, as I discussed above, the model endogenously generates ine¢ cient policies. Note
that in the simple framework proposed here, the unique potential source of ine¢ ciency is
the excessive allocation of patronage to a particular group. This feature of the equilibrium
helps explain the patterns of ine¢ cient taxation and ine¢ cient transfers coexisting in the
18same group highlighted in the seminal work by Bates (1981) for agricultural policies in
tropical Africa. The model shows that the need to buy support while extracting resources
implies that the optimal policy by the ruler is to tax both groups and then return some
patronage to the supporters, even if it is highly wasteful. This has been a general pattern
of statism in Africa17.
Second, the model predicts a very strong bias in the allocation of public funds. The
excluded group receives no public bene￿ts while the supporter group receives public re-
sources beyond the optimal point. The use of public money in the form of bureaucratic
posts, infrastructure or even access to schools as a form of patronage, as well as the ethnic
bias in the allocation of these goods has been widely documented in Africa. Gikuyus and
later Kalenjin in Kenya, northern groups in both Nigeria and Uganda or Tutsis in Bu-
rundi are just salient examples that have reproduced across the continent. In the Congo,
Mobutu ￿lled the higher ranks of the military and civil service with natives of his province,
Equateur. The bias in favor of the ruling group is reported to be one of the basic sources
of resentment between ethnic groups18.
Third, the bias is not only present in the allocation of patronage: taxation is also
di⁄erential across groups. In particular, in addition to taxes levied on the supporter
group, the model shows that the excluded group is expropriated from the speci￿c share
of its wealth. Bates (1981) and Bates (1989) provide evidence of this pattern: in Ghana
and Uganda, among other examples, the coalition that supported the leader extracted
resources from the co⁄ee and cocoa planters. These are crops that involve substantial
speci￿c long term investment. On the contrary, in Kenya the Gikuyu controlled the co⁄ee
growing parts of the country, and hence the discrimination against these crops was much
less evident.
The model also predicts that a change in the group controlling power should be followed
17See Collier and Gunning (1999) or Easterly and Levine (1997) and the references thereof for a
description of the excess ine¢ cient intervention.
18See Horowitz (1985) and Bates (1983). Also, see Collier and Garg (1999) which document that ethnic
and kin relations are rewarded with higher wages in the public sector.
19by a change in taxation, spending and allocation of public resources. These patterns are
widely documented in Africa. For instance, the ascension to power by Moi in Kenya
was followed by a substitution of Gikuyus by Kalenjin in all echelons of the state19. In
Ghana, cocoa has been heavily taxed by all governments, civil and military, except the
one headed by Ko￿Busia, a native from the Ashanti region which contains a large share of
smallholders that grow cocoa. In Cameroon, the substitution of Ahidjo in 1982 unleashed
another deep ethnic purge of the bureaucracy. Similar dynamics are found in Nigeria.
This pattern of discrimination both in raising revenue and in public expenditures sup-
ports the vision that a particular ethnic group has the government captured20. However,
the model suggests that the actual bene￿ts of such capture are not spread throughout the
group. The particular elite that holds power extracts so many resources that part of this
money comes from the pockets of non-elite members of the group. In equilibrium, ￿A > 0
which implies that the ruler is able to reduce his followers￿utility. The next subsection
studies the determinants of ￿A. Wa Wamwere (2003) describes this absence of balance in
the reception of spoils within a group in a colorful way:
￿The cream of government service goes to the ruling ethnic elites, the
crumbs to the lesser ethnic elites, and dust to members of the so-called ruling
ethnic community￿and ￿Among the Gikuyu of Kenya, the approving masses
are called grill lickers, njuna ndara￿ .
Fourth, the results of the model rationalize the existence of kleptocratic elites sup-
ported by masses of impoverished ethnic followers. Even though in absolute terms the
masses are made worse o⁄ by the existence of rent-creating policies, in relative terms it
is much better to belong to the group in power than to the excluded group, and hence
they are willing to defend the status quo vis ￿ vis a leader from another group. This
fear of the future explains the puzzle of support. The members of a narrow elite around
19See Barkan and Chege (1989) for an account of the reallocation of posts and resources.
20That african citizens generally believe that this is the case is documented, for instance, in Posner
(2005). See also Wa Wamwere (2003) for a powerful description of these ethnic dynamics.
20the leader are thus the ones extracting the lion￿ s share of the rents that these ine¢ cient
policies create. Evidence of Kleptocratic tendencies abound in Africa, but Mobutu￿ s Zaire
is probably the most cited example. Sani Abacha in Nigeria or Daniel arap Moi in Kenya
have been able to amass personal fortunes counted in the billions of dollars21. Consistent
with this concentration of wealth at the highest levels of leadership, Africa is the continent
with the highest capital ￿ ight22.
3.2 Ampli￿cation of Kleptocracy
The theoretical reason that allows kleptocratic regimes to obtain support in this model is
summarized in expression (7). It makes clear that as long as the supporter group observes
a di⁄erence between being in the supporter status and being excluded under the leadership
of the opponent group, there is a surplus that the current leader can expropriate from his
own supporters. In addition, the more a leader can extract from his supporters, the more
he can extract from the excluded group, thanks to (5) being binding in equilibrium. As
a consequence, there is an ampli￿cation e⁄ect of any characteristic of the economy that
allows one type of ruler to steal.
To see this ampli￿cation mechanism, assume that LA is in power and the institutional
or economic technology of this society changes so that a potential LB will now able to steal
more from his group if he is ever in power. An A citizen understands that, in equilibrium,
this will mean that should she ever fall into an excluded status, her plight will be worse.
This reduces V A(B) in equilibrium. This increases the fear of turnover which in the model
is captured by a loosening of the support constraint (7) for LA. As a consequence, LA
is able to increase ￿Aa to the point where his supporters are again indi⁄erent. Hence
increasing the capacity of LB to steal makes A supporters worse o⁄ even when LA is in
power because not supporting entails taking a lottery that becomes much less favorable,
since both V A(A) and V A(B) have been reduced. This ampli￿cation mechanism is at the
21See Ayittey (1992), Wa Wamwere (2003), Mbaku (2000) or any account of corruption in Africa.
22Collier and Gunning (1999)
21core of the comparative statics developed below and it is the reason why in the expressions
for equilibrium taxation in Proposition 1 the economic and institutional characteristics of
both groups appear.
Expression (12) can be rewritten to identify the substantive forces that allow the leader






1 + ￿A + ￿B +
￿A￿BR(￿A
￿ ) + ￿A(1 + ￿B)R(￿B
￿ )
1 + ￿A + ￿B + R(￿
A
￿ ) (14)
The gap between ￿Aa and R(￿A
￿ ) is exactly ￿A. The forces that allow leaders to create
a wedge between supporters and excluded are twofold. First, their ability to discriminate
in taxation given by ￿
A and ￿
B. The e⁄ect of this ability on the capacity to extract
resources appears in the ￿rst summand in expression (14). Second, their capacity to
allocate patronage, which drives the second summand in (14). Hence, the two e⁄ects
appear in additively separable terms. If the ethnic structure of a given society does not
coincide with an economic sectorial cleavage or there are no important speci￿cities in the
economy (this would be a case in which ￿
A and ￿
B are small) the ruler ￿nds it di¢ cult to
discriminate in taxation and hence the ￿rst summand would be small. However, patronage
would still make a di⁄erence in the utility of his supporters and hence he would still be
able to extract some rents.
The net amount of funds that the leader LA is able to extract equals XA = ￿A +
R(￿A
￿ ) + (1 ￿ ￿A)￿
B ￿ ￿A￿A
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1 + ￿A + ￿B + 1 ￿ ￿
A > 0
These results imply that starting from a situation with low ￿
Aand ￿
B, an increase
in the speci￿city of income anywhere in the economy increases equilibrium misbehavior
22by the ruler. In the case of a citizen of group A, and increase in ￿
A implies increased
expropriation by a potential LB. As a consequence, she allows her leader to steal more
from her.
An increase in ￿
B has two e⁄ects: the direct one comes from the tax markup that
LA charges on group B. In addition, there is the ampli￿cation e⁄ect detailed above: an
increase in ￿
B means that B citizens will be afraid of losing power if they ever regain it.
Hence a B leader will be able to steal more from them and, as a consequence, steal more
from A citizens that would be excluded in that case. Therefore an increase in ￿
B allows
LA to reduce his supporters￿utility further. In economies where this speci￿cities are
important, such as those where education levels are low, ethnic networks are important
and tree-crops are the backbone of agriculture, rulers are able to exploit this hold-up
problem to their advantage. Note that these characteristics are pervasive in sub-Saharan
Africa.
The weakness of institutions is proxied in the model by ￿ ￿i and ￿ ￿i￿￿i. A high ￿ ￿i implies
a regime that is very di¢ cult to dislodge as long as core supporters keep their defense23.
Moreover, ￿ ￿i￿￿i captures the degree of personalistic rule and the instability of succession
processes: the larger is this di⁄erence, the bigger is the chance of a regime change every
time there is a leader succession. Hence, it is informative to analyze the comparative
statics of rent extraction with respect to these set of parameters. In particular, it is easy
to show that:24
23When ￿ ￿i is higher than the share of the supporting population, institutions are not enforcing repre-
sentativity and there is incumbency advantage.


















































From these comparative statics it is clear that the level of rent extraction is increasing
in both (￿ ￿A ￿ ￿A) and (￿ ￿B ￿ ￿B). The ￿rst one follows from constraint (7): the leader
can extract more resources from his followers the more their probability of keeping power
depends on maintaining this particular leader. In other words, the incumbency advan-
tage (￿ ￿A ￿ ￿A) makes ￿fear￿(V A(A) ￿ V A(B)) a real possibility and thus scales up its
impact. However, the e⁄ect here is more important because it includes the ampli￿cation
of fear discussed above. From this logic of ampli￿cation follows also the fact that LA can
expropriate more the bigger is ￿ ￿B ￿ ￿B.
Hence stealing increases with institutional uncertainty and personality-dependent con-
trol of power. In particular, the leader would like to reduce the grip on power of his
followers if he is ousted, while at the same time strengthen his ethnic group position
vis-￿-vis the excluded group as long as he is in power. While these parameters depend
on characteristics of the polity beyond the control of the ruler, such as the demographic
ethnic balance, they certainly also depend on institutional factors. Even with a divided
society a leader cannot extract much from the citizenry if the hold in power of a particular
group and the stability of a particular regime does not depend on the personal links of the
ruler on top. This reduction on personality dependent incumbency advantage is precisely
a sign of institutional strength and hence it is not surprising that the margin to misbehave
in strongly institutionalized polities is very much reduced.
However, even in strongly institutionalized settings voters face a similar dilemma. A
24strong ideological divide (for instance the one existing between conservatives and liberals
in moral issues) can work as a group de￿nition. In this case, how should a moral conserv-
ative voter punish a conservative candidate that he perceives as deviating25? If he tries to
hold him accountable by witholding his vote, he is (marginally) increasing the probability
of a liberal reaching power, which really reduces this voter￿ s future utility. Hence some
amount of shirking is tolerated by supporters before any punishment is implemented.
It follows that, with respect to this mechanism, the di⁄erence between a well-functioning
democracy and the kleptocracies that are present in Africa is one of degree: strong in-
stitutions limit the extent to which a group can capture power and restrict the set of
tools that the leader can use to widen the gap between supporters and the opposition.
As a consequence, stealing or shirking in o¢ ce is restrained. As institutions place less
constraints on the leader and societal divisions grow wider, accountability of the rulers is
weakened. In the case of Africa, both circumstances occur in their extreme form and, as
a consequence, outright kleptocracy is sustainable.
Comparative statics with respect to the ethnic demographic balance are ambiguous.
On the one hand, all the direct e⁄ects predict a reduction in stealing: increasing ￿A
reduces the bene￿ts from distorting the patronage good for two reasons. First, rents
are reduced at each level of provision because it becomes more expensive to provide it.
Moreover, the optimal level of distortion is reduced because the returns are reduced (less
people in the excluded group to pay for it).
In addition, increasing ￿A reduces the fraction of population excluded, and hence
reduces the extra revenue that comes from the extraction of their speci￿c resources.
However, there is a third, indirect e⁄ect, that makes the overall e⁄ect ambiguous:
increasing ￿A means that, should group A ever lose power, a potential LB would be able
to steal more: he would increase distortions in the allocation of ￿B
￿ because his basis
of support would now be smaller. Using the same logic of ampli￿cation, this allows an
25Strong institutions a⁄ect the possibility of outright stealing in western countries. But there are many
instances of ideological shirking or other ways in which the ruler extracts a personal bene￿t at a cost for
his supporters.




















The ￿rst two summands represent the rents lost from the ability to distort ￿A
￿ and the
third is the direct loss that is a consequence of the smaller size of the excluded group. The
last summand represents the indirect e⁄ect, and it is positive26. For general functional
forms of R(:) this expression cannot be signed, but note that if R(:) is a power function,
R0(￿)
R00(￿) is increasing in ￿. Hence, if the third indirect e⁄ect ever dominates, it will do so at
high levels of ￿A. That is, when the A group includes a wide majority of the population,
the prospect of falling under a B leader is most terrifying because LB will have a very
narrow basis of support, and hence he will use extreme distortions of patronage to steal.
3.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibria
The unique MPE described above provides low levels of utility to both groups while leaders
are able to escape with high amounts of rents. Hence it is an interesting question to ask
whether strategies that condition on past history of play can generate better outcomes for
the citizens at large. There are two interesting insights from the answer to this question.
First, the ability to of supporters to in￿ ict future punishments on their leader will not
help. In other words, the A group citizens cannot reduce stealing in equilibrium from the
di⁄erent LA by conditioning their future play on past misbehavior by LA. The reason is
that the worst lifetime payo⁄ that a leader can have is 0, which is what he obtains by
leaving the game. But this is the threat that is already supporting the MPE. Carrying
this threat out at higher levels of utility is not credible, and hence cannot be part of a
subgame perfect equilibrium. Therefore, punishment between a group and its elite cannot
support a better equilibrium.
26Recall that it is assumed that R00 < 0
26Second, there is a set of strategies that can support better payo⁄s in equilibrium, but
they require coordination among the citizens from the di⁄erent groups. These equilibria
can support ￿rst-best if ￿ is high enough.
Proposition 2 If ￿ is close enough to 1, the following strategies support ￿rst-best for the
citizens of both groups. Without loss of generality assume that S = A.











2. Group A chooses s = 1 only if the ruler proposes P ￿ and there has been no deviation
by any Group in the past
3. zA = 0 only if ￿Aa ￿ ￿
A + ￿Ab and zB = 0 only if ￿Ab ￿ ￿
B + ￿Aa
4. If at any point in the past a Group did not choose s = 0 when their ruler proposed
a policy di⁄erent than P ￿, the play reverts to the MPE stated in Proposition 1
Even if ￿ is not high enough, these type of equilibria can sustain better payo⁄s for the
citizens than the MPE. Hence, coordination across ethnic lines provides a way of escaping
the trap of kleptocracy. This requires to trust the other group that they will oust their
ruler when he steals from anybody. Unfortunately, trust is a rare commodity in a divided
society. In the light of this proposition, it is not surprising that rulers in these countries
put so much e⁄ort in keeping the divided status of their citizenry. This is the basis of
the ￿Divide-and-Rule￿strategy: as it is clear from the MPE, when groups do not trust
each other, rulers can escape accountability. In this sense, this proposition shows that the
division of society is a necessary condition for kleptocracy.
Post-colonial rulers were not the ￿rst ones using these strategies in Africa. Multiple
academic accounts, among them Cooper (2002) and Horowitz (1985) describe the process
27by which ethnic separation became a basic strategy of domination by the colonial powers.
Some groups where protected and allowed to thrive but at the same time they were
demonised among the rest of the population. In reality, political reasons were paramount
in decisions such as assigning Nilotes to the army and Bagandas to the civil service in
Uganda. Examples of ethnic separation and discrimination included di⁄erential access to
schooling and clearly delimited geographical authorities by tribal chiefs and reproduced
throughout the continent. This process of separation and selective protection generated
a basis of support for colonial presence but contributed dramatically to the creation of
ethnic self-consciousness and resentment. These societies were, as a consequence, ripe for
the exploitation of such divisions by their post-colonial leaders.
4 Extensions
4.1 On Public Investment
The evidence from Africa shows that governments overspend in wages and undertake
very little of infrastructure construction27. In the previous sections wages are explicitly
considered as sources of patronage that need to be pledged at every stage and hence
have no durability. The model makes clear why this kind of patronage is overprovided in
divided societies. A simple extension of the model clari￿es why durable investments are
neglected.
Assume that the policy vector P S
t = f￿Aa;￿Ab;IAg includes now I, public investment.
This investment contributes to a stock of public capital K. This stock evolves according
to the following dynamics: Kt = &Kt￿1 + It￿1. Hence, investment today increases the
stock of public capital tomorrow and this capital depreciates at rate 1 ￿ &. The stock of
infrastructure provides a bene￿t F(K) to the supporter group and ￿F(K) to the excluded
group, for ￿ ￿ 1. ￿ thus captures the degree of excludability of public infrastructure.
27See Collier and Gunning (1999) for an account of these patterns. See also Mbaku (2000) and Bates
(1981) for some examples in Cameroon, Nigeria and Ghana of excess expenditure in wages.
28A pure public good would have ￿ = 1. Assume that F 0 > 0 and F 00 < 0. If there is
replacement of a leader there is no investment. Assume, ￿nally, that when there is a
revolt, the enjoyment of the public infrastructure is reduced to  F(K), for   ￿ 1. Hence
  captures the instantaneous cost of upheaval.
To simplify the analysis, and in particular the dynamics that a new state variable could






t ). This implies that the optimal level
of capital in steady state will be reached as soon as a leader has a chance to invest. As a
consequence, a succession induces a transitiory that lasts only for one period. Hence I can
set the problem in terms of the desired level of capital for next period ~ KA. In addition,
assume that ￿ ￿A = ￿ ￿B = 1, for expositional clarity (in this case, support from the group
is enough to keep power with certainty).
The model can be solved in exactly the same way as the previous case28. In particular,
the Markov Perfect Equilibrium has the same characteristics: the leader in power satis￿es
the constraint that makes his supporters indi⁄erent between replacing him and supporting
his rule. Hence, in equilibrium there is no replacement of the leadership. To examine















On the other hand, if they withdraw support, st = 0, they obtain:
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28The inclusion of a new state variable may create multiplicity of MPEa. For expositional ease I only
analyze the equilibrium most similar to the previous case in which strategies are not conditional on the
stock of capital.
29Hence, the support constraint, using stationarity, can be written as:
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The ruling leader faces a problem identical to (8) with an additional choice variable,
KA
t+1 and the support constraint replaced by (15). The ￿rst order conditions from this
program imply that the chosen level of KA
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To interpretat this expression it is better to analyze it in two parts: F 0(KA)(1￿ ) is the
marginal e⁄ect on ￿Aa caused by the contemporaneous e⁄ects of upheaval: if there is no
revolt, supporters enjoy the whole return from infrastructure, while subversion reduces
it to a fraction  . F 0(KA) ￿ ￿[￿A + (1 ￿ ￿A)￿]&F 0(&KA) is the e⁄ect on ￿Aa caused
by the e⁄ect of upheaval on next period￿ s returns: if they support, citizens will receive
the full return per period, F(KA) while ousting the leader has two e⁄ects. First, it
will reduce the stock of capital tomorrow to &KA and second, the citizens enter on the
lottery for the replacement, which means that their expected enjoyment is scaled down
by [￿A + (1 ￿ ￿A)￿]. Note that the equivalent expression for a social planner that would
take the welfare of both groups into account would be:
[￿








Assuming that F(K) = K￿, for ￿ < 1, allows an explicit look at the gap between the
capital level of the leader and the socially optimal level. Denote by ~ KA the level chosen by






2 ￿   ￿ ￿[￿A + (1 ￿ ￿A)￿]&￿
￿A + ￿(1 ￿ ￿A)
Note that this ratio is decreasing in ￿,   and &. The ruler invests relatively more in
capital the faster the good depreciates and the less useful it is during upheaval. These
two forces are ignored by the social planner. There are political reasons behind these
e⁄ects: reduction in & and/or   increases the costs of succession. In particular, one of
the costs of upheaval is the absence of investment for one period. Obviously, this is not
a large cost if depreciation is very slow and, as a consequence, investment is very small
each period. On the contrary, when & approaches 0, K behaves very similarly to ￿, which
is overprovided.
Excludability (￿) has opposite e⁄ects in the ruler and the social planner. When
supporters know that they can be excluded from enjoying public capital if there is a
succession, they are more eager to defend the current regime. Hence an increase in ￿
reduces investment by the leader. For the social planner, investment is increasing in ￿
because more people are able to enjoy the public infrastucture and social welfare increases
while costs remain the same.
Finally, note that when ￿ =   = & = 1, the relative level of capital provided by the
leader is very low, because ￿ is close to 1.
The absence of investment in infrastructure can thus be interpreted under the light of
the model. The political survival of the leader hinges on creating a network of supporters
personally dependent on his presence in power. Building a road gives no advantage to
the leader, because the day a coup ousts him from power the road will still be there
for everybody to enjoy. The same is true for a hospital or a school. Hence there is
underprovision of capital when it is very permanent and/or it is not excludable.29
29This argument for the existence of ine¢ cient clientelist networks based on "￿ ow" goods such as
expanded public employment versus "stock" goods such as infrastructure is present in Robinson and
Verdier (2002). The framework presented here links this phenomenon to the weak institutions and ethnic
divisions present in Africa.
314.2 On Patterns of Ethnic Violence
The logic of the model shows that the leader can enlist the support of his ethnic group by
making sure that ethnic supporters disproportionately fear the prospect of being under
the rule of another group. The ruler can contribute to this fear by acting heavy-handedly
against oppressed groups, and making sure that his rule is seen by everyone as ethnically
based. Ayittey (1999) describes how ordinary Krahn people feared the demise of Samuel
K. Doe, a fellow Krahn, in Liberia. Even though they did not receive any of the spoils
from government, the fact that the regime was clearly almost exclusively Krahn, and
that it was engaged in acts of pillaging, rape and atrocities against the other groups
made clear to them that retribution would be against all Krahn the day the regime was
defeated. Obviously, this made Krahn people collaborate in defending the regime, even
in the absence of any spoil from the government.30 In this way, ethnic violence can be
used to enlist otherwise reluctant members of the group in the defense the regime31.
To see how the prospect of violence is equivalent to patronage links to the ruler the
model can be extended in a very simple way. Assume that by oppressing the excluded
group, the leader can contribute to the level of enmity that the excluded group holds
against the supporter group. Call EAB
t the level of enmity that group B has against





t denotes the amount of costly oppression that LA in￿ icts on B citizens.32 Assume
further that living under the leadership of a group that stocks enmity against you causes
disutility, which is captured by ￿(EAB), with ￿0 > 0, ￿00 < 0, and ￿(0) = 0.
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30See also Harden (1990)
31Political scientists agree in considering violence an important force in de￿ning and separating groups
because it prevents future interactions across ethnic lines. See, for instance, Fearon (1995).
32Glaeser (2005) microfounds the existence of hatred arguments in the electoral arena. I assume here
that violence is a direct creator of enmity.
33Again, for simplicity the case shown assumes ￿ ￿A = ￿ ￿B = 1
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under the usual no-switching constraints and (17). The optimal level of enmity that LA











This expression shows that the leader will cause a higher level of enmity the slower enmity
disappears (the higher ￿), the smaller the time discounting (the higher ￿) and the bigger
the chance that the supporters will lose control of power should they replace the leader
(the lower ￿A). The intuition is perfectly in line with the rest of the argument developed
in the paper: V A(B) is smaller the slower the rate of forgiveness. Moreover, V A(B) is
more probable when 1 ￿ ￿A is small. Both e⁄ects make his supporters warier of entering
into the replacement lottery and this allows the ruler to extract more resources.
To see that enmity behaves similarly to the capacity to discriminate in patronage,
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A = (1 ￿ ￿A) ￿
1￿￿ and ￿
B = (1 ￿ ￿B) ￿
1￿￿. Note that in this expression, the
capacity to induce enmity enhances the capacity to steal in a similar way as the ability
to discriminate in patronage. Kleptocracy can thus be supported by indiscriminate use
of violence in the name of the group, as Samuel K. Doe￿ s Liberia show.
This logic can be used to understand the scale of atrocities and ethnic cleansing in
Rwanda in 1994. Prunier (1995) describes how the "hutu" regime of Habyarimana and
the inner circle captained by his wife was besieged both by the Tutsi guerrillas of the RPF
and the southern moderate hutu elites that were complaining at the level of corruption
and kleptocracy concentrated in northern hands. By making the majority of the hutu
population participate in the atrocities, the regime almost succeeded in doing two things.
First they completely erased the northern-southern divide inside the hutu elites by either
eliminating those hutus deemed too moderate or making them participate in the genocide.
Second, the scale of atrocities against the tutsi minority was so horri￿c, that no hutu could
accept the prospect of living under a tutsi leader for fear of equally horrible retribution.
The massive scale of hutu refugee tides to Zaire is a testament to this strategy. This
pattern of government sponsored ethnic violence, albeit in a somewhat smaller scale has
been present in Uganda, Burundi34 and other countries in the region.
The logic of exclusion and replacement thus provides as a corollary a framework to
understand some of the patterns of high and low level ethnic violence that plague deeply
divided societies, especially when their governments de￿ne themselves in ethnic terms.
5 Conclusion
Post-colonial African citizens have su⁄ered under kleptocracies that have imposed dis-
tortionary and rent-creating policies on their economies. However, accounts coincide in
considering these regimes weak, which sheds doubt on the hypothesis that they have sur-
34See Lemarchand (1996) for an account of the seeds of violence and patterns of ethnic domination in
Burundi.
34vived in power solely due to the use of force to oppress the whole population. On the
contrary, parts of these populations have been mobilized into defending these kleptocratic
regimes.
This paper proposes a coherent model of the political economy of such regimes. The
main contribution of the analysis consists in showing that the political uncertainty of suc-
cession in weakly institutionalized settings can explain most of the political and economic
phenomena that characterize these regimes. In particular, since the use of patronage
networks allow the leader to treat his ethnic group better than the opposition, ethnic sup-
porters are keen in maintaining this relative superiority. Uncertainty in succession makes
supporters reluctant to replace the leader and hence rents are not dissipated. In fact, the
ruler is able to extract resources from all groups in society. From the analysis I derive
a number of corollaries that are consistent with the degree of ethnic bias, bureaucratic
inoperance and patterns of taxation and expenditures observed in such regimes.
The main lesson from the growing ￿eld of analysis of policy determinants in weakly
institutionalized regimes is that their ine¢ ciencies emerge because weak states impose
a very particular set of contraints and needs on their rulers. The same is true for the
political outcomes of such countries. Attempts at helping these economies have to take
into account where the incentives of their leaders are (mis)placed. My analysis reveals
that nominal democratization may not a⁄ect at all the basic forces sustaining absence of
accountability. In particular, reform has to include e⁄ective constraints on the capacity of
the leaders to treat ethnic groups di⁄erently, and it should include mechanisms directed
to smoothing intra-group competition.
References
[1] Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. 2001. ￿Ine¢ cient Redistribution.￿ American
Political Science Review, 95: 649-661.
35[2] Acemoglu, D. Robinson, J. and Verdier, T. 2004. ￿Kleptocracy and Divide-
and-Rule: a Model of Personal Rule.￿Journal of the European Economic Association,
2: 162-192.
[3] Ayittey, G. 1992. Africa Betrayed. New York: St Martin￿ s Press.
[4] Barkan, J. and Chege, M. 1989. ￿Decentralizing the State: District Focus and
the Politics of Reallocation in Kenya.￿The Journal of Modern African Studies, 27:
431-453.
[5] Barro, R. 1973. ￿The control of politicians: an economic model.￿Public Choice,
14: 19-42.
[6] Bates, R. 1981. Markets and States in Tropical Africa. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
[7] Bates, R. 1983. ￿Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics
in Contemporary Africa.￿In State versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas,
ed. Olurunsola, V. and Rothchild, D. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
[8] Bates, R. 1989. Beyond the Miracle of the Market. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
[9] Bates, R. 2000. ￿Ethnicity and Development in Africa: A Reappraisal.￿American
Economic Review, 90: 131-134.
[10] Bates, R. and La Ferrara, E. 2001 ￿Political Competition in Weak States.￿
Economics and Politics, 13: 159-184.
[11] Bratton, M. and van der Walle, N. 1997. Democratic Experiments in Africa:
Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge University Press.
[12] Caselli, F. and Coleman, J. 2002. ￿On the Theory of Ethnic Con￿ ict.￿Unpub-
lished Manuscript, Harvard University.
36[13] Chabal, P. and Daloz, J-P. 1999. Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instru-
ment. Oxford: The International African Institute.
[14] Collier, P. and Garg, A. 1999. ￿On kin groups and wages in the Ghanaian
labour market.￿Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 61: 133￿ 152.
[15] Collier, P. and Gunning J.W. 1999 ￿Explaining African Economic Perfor-
mance.￿Journal of Economic Literature, 37: 64-111.
[16] Cooper, F. 2002. Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
[17] Easterly, W. and Levine, R. 1997. ￿Africa￿ s Growth Tragedy: Politics and
Ethnic Divisions.￿Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111: 1203-1250.
[18] Easterly, W. 2002. The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists￿Adventures and
Misadventures in the Tropics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[19] Ellman, M. and Wantchekon, L. 2000. ￿Electoral Competition under the
Threat of Political Unrest.￿Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115: 499-531.
[20] Fafchamps, M. 2004. Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
[21] Fearon, J. 1995. ￿Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem.￿Typescript. Stanford
University.
[22] Fearon, J. and Laitin, D. 1996. ￿Explaining inter Ethnic Cooperation.￿Ameri-
can Political Science Review, 90: 715-729.
[23] Ferejohn, J. 1986. ￿Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control.￿Public Choice,
50: 5-26.
[24] Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. 1991. Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
37[25] Gavazza, A. and Lizzeri, A. 2005. ￿Transparency and Economic Policy.￿Type-
script. NYU.
[26] Glaeser, E. 2005. ￿The Political Economy of Hatred.￿Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 120: 45-86.
[27] Harden, B. 1990. Africa: Dispatches from a Fragile Continent. New York: Norton.
[28] Herbst, J. 2000. States and Power in Africa. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
[29] Horowitz, D. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Con￿ict. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
[30] Jackson, R. and Rosberg, C. 1982. Personal Rule in Black Africa. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
[31] Lemarchand, R. 1996. Burundi: Ethnic Con￿ict and Genocide. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press
[32] Mbaku, J.M. 2000. Bureaucratic and Political Corruption in Africa. Malabar, Fla:
Krieger Publishing Company
[33] Migdal, J. 1988. Strong Societies and Weak States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press
[34] Miguel, E. and Gugerty, M. 2005. ￿Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions and Pub-
lic Goods in Kenya.￿Journal of Public Economics, 89: 2325-2368.
[35] Posner, D. 2005. Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. New York: Cambridge
University Press
[36] Prunier, G. 1995. The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. New York, NY:
Columbia University Press.
38[37] Robinson, J. and Verdier, T. 2002. ￿The Political Economy of Clientelism.￿
CEPR Discussion Paper no. 3205.
[38] Robinson, J. and Torvik, R. 2005. ￿White Elephants.￿Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 89: 197-210.
[39] Throup, D. and Hornsby, C. 1998. Multi-Party Politics in Kenya. Athens, Oh:
Ohio University Press.
[40] Van de Walle, N. 2001. The Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999. Cambridge
University Press.
[41] Wa Wamwere, K. 2003. Negative ethnicity: from bias to genocide. New York:
Seven Stories Press
396 Appendix
6.1 Proof to Lemma 1
First, I associate to the constraints in program (8) the Lagrange multipliers ￿, ￿, ￿ and
￿, respectively. The ￿rst order conditions of this program yield:
￿
A + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = 0 (18)
1 ￿ ￿




AA) = 0 (20)
￿(1 ￿ ￿
A) + ￿ = 0 (21)
From (21) it is obvious that ￿AB = 0. From (18) and (19) and the fact that ￿ and ￿
cannot both be strictly positive at the same time we learn that ￿ = 0, ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿A and
￿ = 1. ￿ = 0 and ￿ > 0 imply that the second restriction is not saturated. These values
for the Lagrange multipliers directly imply the result in Lemma 1.
6.2 Proof to Proposition 1

















Denote the mapping from expectations to current play ￿(￿A;￿B) = (￿Aa;￿Ab;￿Ba;￿Bb),
given by (10), (11), (22) and (23). Note that since constraint (7) is respected, groups
40always support their leaders. As a consequence, in equilibrium the continuation values
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Solving these equations for V A(A)￿V A(B) and substituting the resulting expression





￿(￿ ￿A ￿ ￿A)
1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿ ￿A ￿ ￿ ￿B)
[~ ￿
Ba ￿ R(~ ￿
BA) ￿ ~ ￿
Aa + R(~ ￿
AA)]
Where the superscript ￿ denotes equilibrium values. Therefore, in terms of policy,
￿A =
￿(￿ ￿A￿￿A)
1+￿(1￿￿ ￿A￿￿ ￿B)[~ ￿Ba ￿ R(~ ￿BA) ￿ ~ ￿Aa + R(~ ￿AA)]. This expression for ￿A (and the
symmetric de￿nition of ￿B) provides a mapping from actual play to consistent expecta-
tions ￿(￿Aa;￿Ab;￿Ba;￿Bb) = (￿CA;￿CB). The equilibrium posits the requirement that
these expectations be consistent with future play. In this context this reduces to ￿nding
a ￿xed point of the mapping that relates expectations to themselves: ￿(￿(￿A;￿B)) =
(￿CA;￿CB). Explicitly, this mapping is the following:
￿
CA =
￿(￿ ￿A ￿ ￿A)










￿(￿ ￿B ￿ ￿B)








For simplicity denote ￿i =
￿(￿ ￿i￿￿i)





A + R(￿BB)) + ￿A￿B(￿
B + R(￿AA))




B + R(￿AA)) + ￿A￿B(￿
A + R(￿BB))
1 + ￿A + ￿B
41Since there is a single ￿xed point, uniqueness of MPE is shown. These values for ￿A and
￿B, together with Lemma 1 establish the proposition.
6.3 Proof to Proposition 2
Denote by V A
MPE(A) the lifetime payo⁄for citizen A in the MPE starting at state A. De￿ne
in analogous terms V A
MPE(B), V B
MPE(A) and V B










!B ￿ ￿￿ + R(￿￿)
￿
. These are the ￿rst best payo⁄s.
From the point of view of the ruler, assuming that his supporters play the equilibrium
strategy, he obtains 0 in any possible deviation and in equilibrium. Hence, proposing P ￿
is a best response.
The ruler can try to break the collusion of the citizens by o⁄ering the best possible
payo⁄ to his supporters and hope that they will accept it. Given constraints (5) and (6)
and the stragies postulated, the best payo⁄ to his supporters is (assume without loss of
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The supporters will support him only if V A
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#
Now, the ￿rst additive term is negative. However, the second additive term is strictly
positive. Clearly, for ￿ close enough to 1 the di⁄erence is positive.
Hence there is no current payo⁄ that can compensate the supporting group from
breaking the equilibrium and falling into the MPE. Since the MPE equilibrium is self-
sustainable as a punishment strategy, the proposed strategy pro￿le is a SPE that supports
￿rst best for the citizens.
426.4 Comparative Statics
The expressions for the comparative statics of ￿A with respect to the institutional para-
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